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Abstract
This dissertation considers changes of health insurance system of United States
that affect health outcomes and labor market outcomes of population. The first
chapter examines how Medicaid policy aimed to improve health status of low-income
parents affects the health outcomes of young children. Estimates from variations in
Medicaid rules across states and over time, show that there exist positive spillover
effects on children from Medicaid expansions targeting parents. The child mortality
declines more in states with higher level of generosity in Medicaid policy and the effect
is larger among black children. Simulations indicate that recent Medicaid expansion
under Affordable Care Act Reform can deepen the existing child mortality disparity
across states due to different adoption of Medicaid expansion for low income adult
population. The second chapter examines Massachusetts health care reform and
its impact on labor market outcomes of older males approaching retirement. I find
that older males are more likely to remain in full-time employed status rather to
choose early retirement, and part-time employment increased only among low-income
population who are eligible for subsidized health insurance. The results suggests that
there exists employment-lock effect from increase of employers providing employer-
sponsored health insurances following the reform.
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Chapter 1
Do Children Benefit from Their
Parents’ Medicaid Coverage?
Abstract
Does parental Medicaid coverage matter for children who are already covered by Medicaid? This pa-
per examines the spillover effect from low-income parents’ Medicaid coverage to their children using
cross-state variation in Medicaid eligibility between 1990 and 2004. I construct the index of Medicaid
eligibility for parents measured by the fraction of eligible parent population based on the detailed
Medicaid policy of each state. Using plausibly exogenous variation in constructed index, I provide
new evidence that Medicaid expansion targeting low-income parents leads to a significant decline in
the mortality rates of infants and children ages 1-4. The effect is larger and more significant among
the black population than among the white population, and saves 3.1 black children’s lives during 15
years of analysis. The differential effect across races leads to a decline in the black-white mortality
gap. I explain the difference in effectiveness of parental coverage as a result from the difference
in the take-up of Medicaid. The Medicaid-eligible children with Medicaid-eligible parents are two
times more likely to enroll, and eligible black children whose parents are also eligible are seven times
more likely to enroll. Simulation results using the features of Medicaid expansion in the Affordable
Care Act suggest that the different adoption of Medicaid expansion may enlarge existing mortality
disparities across states. The spillover effect on children’s health from the Medicaid expansion for
parents suggests that the benefit of the policy would reach beyond the direct benefi09ciaries and the
evaluation of policy should take the additional benefit into consideration.
JEL Codes : I13, I14, I18, J10, J18
Keywords : Medicaid; Family Coverage; Mortality
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I. Introduction
Does providing parents Medicaid coverage benefit children? Numerous studies
exist on the relationship between children’s health insurance status and their health
care utilization and health outcomes. Covering children has improved children’s ac-
cess to care and furthered their health outcomes (Currie and Gruber 1996a; Dafny
and Gruber 2005; Howell et al. 2011). However, even among insurance-covered chil-
dren, there exists a disparity in health outcomes by socioeconomic status (Currie and
Thomas 1995; Case 2000). Thus, the role of parents in determining children’s health
outcomes draws the attention of researchers. Increased awareness of the importance
of family-coverage has led researchers to examine the relationship between parental
coverage and children’s coverage and health care access. More children are enrolled in
Medicaid in states with expanded Medicaid for parents (Lambrew 2001; Dubay and
Kenny 2004; Wolfe et al. 2006; Aizer and Grogger 2003; Sommers 2006). Children
with insured parents have better access to health care than children with uninsured
parents (Gifford et al. 2005; Guendelman 2006). However, the literature has not
provided a clear answer on the relationship between children’s health outcomes and
parental coverage.
Having uninsured members within the family can have adverse consequences for
the whole family: parents’ poor health status affects children’s health and well-being
negatively, and reduced labor supply and large medical bills can cause financial inse-
curities for families (Institute of Medicine, 2002).1 Since parents play the main role
in children’s health investments, the health insurance status of parents could have
far-reaching effects on children.
The current Affordable Care Act (ACA) health reform is expected to make sig-
nificant changes in coverage for low-income parents by expanding Medicaid for non-
1For example, Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) show that an increase in Medicaid eligibility reduces
personal bankruptcies and suggested health insurance can be a substitute form of financial protection.
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elderly, non-disabled adults.2 The reform is expected to improve the coverage dis-
parity affecting low-income families.3 This paper examines the possible benefits for
children from expanding Medicaid coverage to parents. Moreover, it addresses the
deficiency in the existing literature by examining the relationship between parental
coverage and children’s health outcomes.
Child health has been a top priority goal of Medicaid since its enactment in 1965.
Towards the initial goal of improvement in child health, Medicaid for children con-
tinued to expand during the 1980s and 1990s. Currently almost 90% of low-income
children are eligible for Medicaid and half of low-income children are covered by Med-
icaid (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). Many studies evaluate the effects of these
Medicaid expansions on child health outcomes. Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) esti-
mate the health effects from the expansions of Medicaid eligibility during the 1980s
and early 1990s.4 Meyer and Wherry (2012) examine the Medicaid coverage during
childhood and possible health effects in teens. Goodman-Bacon (2013) examine the
effect of Medicaid introduction on non-white child mortality. However the coverage
for low-income parents has been neglected and low-income working parents have re-
mained the most vulnerable population in terms of health insurance coverage.5 The
awareness of the importance of covering both of the parent and the child has increased
and welfare reform in the 1990s increased the Medicaid eligible parent population by
2The ACA expands Medicaid eligibility to non-elderly adults up to 138 % of the Federal Poverty
Line (FPL). Among 50 states and the District of Columbia, 24 states declined to expand Medicaid
following the Supreme Court Decision in 2012. The median eligibility income threshold for parents
rose from 106% in 2013 to 138% among states that expanded Medicaid. Among states that did not
adopt ACA Medicaid expansion, the median income threshold for Medicaid eligibility remains at
46% of the federal poverty line.
3The Health Reform Monitoring Survey (HRMS) conducted by the Urban Institute showed that
the uninsured rate of parents decreased by 14.4% nationwide. States that expanded Medicaid expe-
rienced a 33.3% decrease in the uninsured rate for parents between September 2013 and June 2014
(Urban Institute, 2014).
4Currie and Gruber(1996a) examine Medicaid expansion for children and child mortality improve-
ment. Currie and Gruber(1996b) examine birth outcomes and infant mortality through Medicaid
expansion for pregnant women.
5The low-income working parents consists of 40% of uninsured population in the U.S.(Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2013)
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decoupling cash welfare receipt and Medicaid eligibility. Still the eligibility income
threshold for parents remained at a very low level, mostly below the poverty line, and
there exists significant variation in Medicaid eligibility across states.6
I examine whether children with uninsured parents are more disadvantaged in
health care utilization by comparing Medicaid covered children having uninsured
parents with those having insured parents. Building on the descriptive relationship
between parental insurance status and children’s health care utilization, I examine
whether Medicaid expansions for parents affect the mortality of infants and children
exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in Medicaid eligibility over time. The funda-
mental question that I aim to answer is whether states that offered a more generous
level of Medicaid eligibility to parents have experienced improvements in infant and
child mortality compared with states where the Medicaid coverage for parents was
more limited. I also control for the Medicaid eligibility for children, allowing me to see
whether coverage eligibility of children plays a role in mortality. In terms of utiliza-
tion, I find that the presence of uninsured parents has a negative effect on children’s
health care utilization even among children covered by Medicaid. Medicaid-covered
children with uninsured parents have fewer physician visits and are less likely to
receive preventive care compared with children having Medicaid covered parents.
Can the disparity in health care utilization translate into disparities in health
outcomes? To answer this question, I examine the mortality of children with respect
to the exogenous change in health insurance coverage of parents. I employ the Med-
icaid generosity index introduced in Currie and Gruber (1996a,b) and construct the
indices both for children and their parents.7 The Medicaid expansions occurred at
very different rates across states which provides plausibly exogenous variation in the
6Besides the income threshold eligibility rule, there are variations across states in Medicaid eli-
gibility criteria including the existence of an asset test, the work hour limit (100-hour rule) and the
level of income disregards.
7Currie and Gruber(1996a) constructed the Medicaid generosity index for children ages 1-15, and
Currie and Gruber(1996b) constructed index for pregnant women.
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Medicaid generosity indices.
I find that expanding Medicaid coverage to parents reduces infant mortality and
child mortality. I also find that there exist substantial difference in effects of the Med-
icaid expansions between black and white population. The magnitude of the impact
is larger and more significant for black infants and children, and is thus effective in
reducing the black-white mortality gap. Estimates suggest that the increase in the
Medicaid-eligible parent population accounts for 5.06% of the reduction in infant mor-
tality and 4.6% of the reduction in child mortality between 1990 and 2004. The effect
is larger and more significant among the black population. The expansion accounts
for 7.7% of the reduction in black infant mortality and 7.85% of the reduction in black
child mortality. The different magnitude of effects by races induced a significant de-
cline in the black-white gap in mortality. The parental Medicaid expansion accounts
for 10.02% of reduction in the black-white infant mortality gap and for 10.89% of the
black-white child mortality gap.
The difference in the take-up of Medicaid between children who they are only
eligible in the family and children whose parents are also eligible is one possible
explanation for the different effectiveness. I examine Medicaid enrollment of infants
and children when only the child is eligible in a family and when both the parent and
child are eligible. The take-up rate is two times larger when both the parent and child
are eligible within a family compared with when only the child being eligible. Among
black population, the difference in the take-up is significantly larger. The probability
of enrollment when both the parent and child are eligible for Medicaid in a family is
seven times that when only the child is eligible in a family.
The current ACA health care reform brings significant changes in low-income par-
ents’ Medicaid eligibility. However the difference in adoption of Medicaid expansion
across states can cause disparities in mortality rates. I simulate the mortality change
arising from the increased parental eligibility level under the current ACA Medicaid
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implementation for each state. I also present the mortality change under the as-
sumption that every state had adopted Medicaid expansion. The simulation results
suggest that child mortality rates would decrease by 5 percent more if the Medicaid
expansion weren’t optional compared with the simulated mortality under the current
policy. The results also suggest that the different adoption of Medicaid expansion
widens the disparities in mortality rate across states. The variation in child mortality
rate would decrease by 12 percentage points and the variation in black child mor-
tality would decrease by 19.9 percentage points with uniform adoption of Medicaid
expansion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on Medicaid
expansions and the data I use. Section 3 presents mortality analysis. Section 4
discusses the health care utilization of children by their parents’ health insurance
status. Section 5 offers some final thoughts.
II. Background
A Background on Medicaid
Historically, Medicaid eligibility was tied to participation in the Aid for Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and was limited to children and their single
parents with family income far below the poverty line. Beginning with the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA 84), the linkage between AFDC coverage and eligi-
bility for Medicaid was gradually weakened.8 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989 (OBRA 89) required states to offer coverage to children below age six
in families with income up to 133 % of the federal poverty line and many states set
8DERFA 84 eliminated the family structure requirements for Medicaid eligibility of young children
by requiring states to cover children born after September 1, 1983 who lived in families that were
income-eligible for AFDC.
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the eligibility income level above the federal guideline.9 The establishment of the
State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP, currently CHIP) in 1997 expanded
public insurance coverage to children in families whose income was too high to qual-
ify for Medicaid, and increased the eligible children population. With the additional
source of public health insurance coverage for low-income children, more than 90 %
of children in low-income families became eligible for Medicaid.10
While the Medicaid eligibility for children has expanded dramatically, parents’
Medicaid eligibility income threshold was far more restricted. It was beneath the
poverty line and tied to cash welfare receipt until 1990s, contrary to the earlier decou-
pling for children in 1980s. During the 1990s, some states started to extend Medicaid
eligibility to low-income parents who were not receiving cash welfare. With the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA
96), Medicaid eligibility for parents ceased to be tied to the receipt of cash welfare
and states have had more flexibility in covering low-income working parents. However
Medicaid for parents is still limited to very low-income adults and there exist signif-
icant variations across states. Table 1 presents the income thresholds for working
parents with dependent children by states between 1990 and 2004.
B Data
Using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I examine whether children
with insured parents are better off in terms of health care utilization to examine
possible channels between parental Medicaid expansion and child health improvement.
912 states set the eligibility above the federal guideline an example being 185% of FPL (CA, CT,
IA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, RI, SC,VT). However Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) suggested
the further expansion following OBRA 89 had only modest impact on health insurance coverage for
children due to very low marginal take-up rates compared with expansion for children under poverty.
10Medicaid and CHIP are different programs but have had similar impacts on the low-income
children (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004). In this paper, I do not distinguish between these two
programs and include CHIP in the Medicaid category. A low-income family is one with family-income
less than 200 % of poverty line.
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MEPS is a nationally representative survey of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized
population conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
MEPS collects information about the health care access and utilization and health
insurance coverage at both of the individual and family level. Also MEPS contains
information on demographic characteristics, income, and employment status. One
benefit from using MEPS for the analysis is that it oversamples Hispanics, Blacks
and low-income families those with income less than 200 percent of poverty line.
The over-sampling of low-income families provides a large enough sample of Medicaid
beneficiaries to credibly perform our analysis of health care utilization. Unfortunately
public-use MEPS does not provide the state of residence, so we cannot link policy
changes to these data.
To move beyond a descriptive analysis, I estimate the relationship between Medi-
caid expansion of parents and their children on children’s mortality. I use two different
data sources to construct the key variables of the analysis: Medicaid generosity indices
and mortality rates of infants and children.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement from 1991 to 2005 is
used to construct the Medicaid generosity indices for infants, children and parents
according to the Medicaid eligibility rules of each state from 1990-2004.11 Medicaid
eligibility rules changed at different rates across states during the period. The varia-
tions across states in policy details are the sources of the identification of the impact
of Medicaid. The indices measure the fraction of the Medicaid eligible population
among the total population in each state, year and age group. The age groups are
defined as infants less than 1 year-old and children ages 1 to 4.12 I restrict samples
to children who are living with at least one parent in the family, in order to examine
the parents’ behavioral influence on children’s health.13
11The March CPS contains income information for previous year, so I use data from 1991 to 2005.
12I restrict the sample to very young children, since they are more likely to be affected by parental
behavior.
13There was slight increase in young children living with neither of their parents, but they remain
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Using the sample, I assign Medicaid eligibility for each child and their parents
according to the resident states’ eligibility rules.14 However, the index for Medicaid
generosity faces a small cell problem. There are several states without any individ-
uals satisfying the eligibility rule. Also the variation in the index reflects not only
variation in states’ Medicaid policies but also changes in the income distribution and
the composition of the population within the states.
To overcome these problems, I use simulated eligibility, an alternative way to
measure policy generosity developed in Cutler and Gruber (1996) and Currie and
Gruber (1996a, b). I begin by drawing a nationally representative random sample of
1,000 individuals of each age group from every year’s March CPS. I take this nationally
representative sample to calculate the fraction of infants, children and parents who
would be eligible for Medicaid if they lived in each state. This simulated eligibility
measure provides an index of Medicaid generosity for each states that reflects only
variation in the Medicaid eligibility rules across states and years.
Figure 1 shows the change in simulated Medicaid eligibility index for children
ages 1-4 and their parents between 1990 and 2004. I separate states into two groups:
high-eligibility and low-eligibility. High-eligibility states are those in which the par-
ents’ Medicaid eligibility income threshold is above the U.S. median; low-eligibility
states are those in which the eligibility income threshold is below the U.S. median
for each year. The fraction of an eligible parent population is persistently lower in
low-eligibility states over the time period of analysis.
To measure mortality, I use the Multiple Cause of Death Files from the National
Vital Statistics System to construct infant mortality and child mortality by state,
year, race and cause-of-death between 1990 and 2004.15 The infant mortality rate
around 1-2% of all children under age 5 for each year.
14Detailed AFDC eligibility rules and Medicaid rules are from National Governors Association
Report by years, Congress report on Medicaid(1993, 1998) and Kaiser Family Foundation Medicaid
and Uninsured Reports. Thankfully, Tal Gross generously provided the invaluable data on the
Medicaid policy details for children.
15Each record of the micro-data is constructed on information abstracted from death certificates
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(IMR) is defined as the number of deaths of infants less than 1 year old in each state
and year per 1,000 live births. The child mortality rate (CMR) is defined as the
number of deaths of children ages 1-4 per 10,000 population in each state and year.
Later I also exploit information listed on the cause of death to better assess channels
through which parents access affects child health.
III. Mortality Analysis
Death is an extreme but important health outcome, especially for children. Much
previous research has shown the positive impact of Medicaid on child mortality (Currie
and Gruber, 1996a ; Howell et al. 2010; Meyer and Wherry 2010 ; Goodman-Bacon
2013 ).16 In this section I add to this literature by examining whether the expansion
of Medicaid for parents affects infant and child mortality.
A Empirical Analysis
I regress the state-year mortality rate of infants and children on the Medicaid
generosity indices of children and parents via the following equation.
𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑎
𝑠 + 𝛼
𝑎
𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑎
1𝐶𝐼
𝑎
𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑎
2𝑃𝐼
𝑎
𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖
𝑎
𝑠𝑡 (1.1)
where𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑠𝑡 denotes the mortality rate by age group 𝑎 : infants, children ages 1-4 , in
state 𝑠 and year 𝑡, 𝛼𝑎𝑠 are state fixed effects and 𝛼
𝑎
𝑡 are year fixed effects. The variable
𝐶𝐼𝑎𝑠𝑡 denotes the Medicaid generosity index of age group a, for each state s and year
t measured by fraction of Medicaid eligible population by agegroup. Similarly 𝑃𝐼𝑎𝑠𝑡
denotes the fraction of parents eligible for Medicaid. 𝜖𝑎𝑠𝑡 represents unobserved state-
filed in Vital Statistics offices of each state and the District of Columbia. Causes of death were coded
according to the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision during 1990-1998 and the
Tenth Revision from 1999 on.
16The impact of Medicaid on mortality examined for various population group. Adults population
also examined in many studies (Wilper et al. 2009; Sommers et al. 2012)
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year shocks that affect the deaths of children. All observations are by state and
year.17 Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for possible serial
autocorrelation within state.
B Results
The estimates of eq.(2) are presented in Table 5. Panel A presents results on the
infant mortality rate and Panel B for results on the child mortality rate by races.
An increase in the Medicaid generosity index for infants reduces the infant mortality
rate but the effect is insignificant. However the increase in the index for parents of
infants significantly reduces the infant mortality rate. The coefficient implies that a
10 percentage point increase in the index for parents results in 1.29 percent decline in
the infant mortality rate relative to the baseline mortality. Between 1990 and 2004,
the Medicaid generosity index for parents increased by 7.49 percentage points, which
decreases the infant mortality rate by 0.96 percent. This explains 5.06 percent of the
infant mortality rate reduction during that period.
The magnitude of the effect is larger and more significant among black infants.
The black infant mortality rate decreases by 3.41 percent relative to the baseline
mortality for the increase in index for parents during 1990-2004. The parental index
increase explains 7.7 percent of the reduction in black infant mortality rate reduction
during the same period. The estimate on the white infant mortality shows a negative
relationship but the result is not significant.
The estimates on child mortality are similar to the results on the infant mortality
rate. The increase in the index for children appears to decrease the child mortality
rate slightly, but the effect is insignificant. However, the increase in the parents’
Medicaid generosity index has significantly reduced the child mortality as well. A 10
17I tried various other specifications including the fraction of the population in poverty, per capita
income for each state, the state unemployment rate and a linear time trend. They did not generate
significantly different results compared with the fixed effects specification.
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percentage point increase in the fraction of eligible parents is estimated to lead to a
3.6 percent decrease in the child mortality rate. Between 1990 and 2004, the fraction
of eligible parents of children increased by 7.5 percentage points, which accounts 6.55
percent of child mortality reduction. Among black children, the increase in fraction
of Medicaid eligible parents accounts for 7.85 percent of the reduction in black child
mortality. The increase in the fraction of the eligible parent population does not have
a significant effect on white child mortality.
Why is Parental Medicaid Expansion more effective than Medicaid expan-
sion for Children? : Medicaid take-up
Why is expanding parental Medicaid more effective than expanding Medicaid
coverage to infants and children in improving mortality? I suggest that the different
take-up of Medicaid may explain the difference in effectiveness. Card and Shore-
Sheppard (2004) and Currie and Gruber (1996b) show that expansions of Medicaid
to low-income population are more effective than the Medicaid expansions for higher-
income population in terms of insurance coverage and health outcomes due to the low
take-up among higher-income population.18 I examine whether there exists disparity
in Medicaid take-up by comparing when both the parent and child are eligible and
when only the child is eligible in a family.
All sample children in the mortality analysis are born after 1984 and are affected
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in 1989 (OBRA 89).19 Thus children
under the poverty line in the analysis are already potentially eligible whereas parental
expansion is limited to those with very low-income. Therefore a large share of parent
18Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) showed that the impact of Medicaid is lower for expansion
above the poverty line on health insurance coverage due to the low take-up rate among children.
Also Currie and Gruber (1996b) showed that targeted Medicaid expansion for low-income women is
more effective in birth outcome improvement than broad expansion for higher income women and
suggest that these heterogeneous effects are due to the take-up difference.
19OBRA 89 made children under age 6 in families with income less than 133 % of the poverty line
became Medicaid eligible.
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population was not eligible for Medicaid relative to children. I consider child-only
eligibility as a “broad expansion” and parent-eligibility as a “targeted expansion”,
which are the terminologies used in Currie and Gruber(1996b). I examine the take-
up of Medicaid for children using linear probability model of the form:
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔
𝑐
𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔
𝑝
𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 (1.2)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an indictor of Medicaid enrollment for individual 𝑖.20 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a set of
characteristics of the children including age, race, single mother headed household,
income and mother’s employment status. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a dummy indicating whether only
the child is eligible for Medicaid, and 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑖 is a dummy for both of the child and the
parent being eligible. 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an error term. The standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
The regression results in Table 6 imply that approximately 9% of children en-
rolled in Medicaid when only the child is eligible in a family. The take-up probability
increases significantly when both the child and parent are eligible for the Medicaid.
About 18% of children enrolled in Medicaid when both the parent and child are eligi-
ble. The difference in Medicaid take-up is also large among the black child population.
2.4% of child are enrolled if only they are eligible for Medicaid in the family. Black
children are seven times more likely to enroll in Medicaid if both the child and parent
are eligible for Medicaid than when only the child is eligible.
Black and White Disparities
Blacks are more likely to be uninsured and more likely to be eligible for Medicaid.21
Thus, Medicaid plays a key role for covering the black population and the expansions
20The CPS March report individuals’ health insurance coverage in the previous year.
21The fraction of eligible black parent is two times higher than white parents (37.53% versus 14%).
43.15% of white infants are eligible for Medicaid, but 73.99 % of black infants are eligible; 37.94%
of white children ages 1-4 are eligible for Medicaid while 68.11% of black children are eligible based
on the analysis sample using March CPS from 1991 to 2005.
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of Medicaid could be more effective among black population. Figure 3 shows the black-
white disparity in mortality rate for infants and children. While the mortality gap
stabilized at a high level during the 1980s, the disparity started to decline significantly
from the mid-1990s. To examine whether the Medicaid expansion had an equalizing
effect between black and white, I examine the black-white mortality gap and how
expanding Medicaid to parents affects the change in the mortality gap.
Table 7 shows the result of Medicaid expansion and its impact on the black-
white mortality disparity. Consistent with previous studies, I found that expanding
Medicaid had a larger impact on mortality among black children than among white
children.22 While the Medicaid expansions for children and infants do not affect
the change of mortality gap, expanding coverage to parents is effective in reducing
the mortality gap for both infants and children. For infants, a 10 percentage point
increase in the Medicaid generosity index for parents leads to a 5.7% decrease in the
black-white infant mortality gap. The increase in the parental Medicaid generosity
decreases the black-white gap for child mortality by 7.7%. The results suggest that the
expanding Medicaid for parents might be a way to improve health outcome disparities
by races.
Causes of Deaths
The Vital Statistics data provide information about the causes of deaths. If the
reduction of mortality rates is due to improved health care utilization, deaths from
internal causes would decrease more than deaths from external causes. Table 8 shows
that the increase in eligibility of parents is correlated with a significant reduction in
infant and child deaths due to internal causes. The results suggest that a parental
Medicaid expansion has positive effect on a mortality reduction of children through
improvement in health care utilization. Deaths by external causes show different
22Currie and Gruber(1996a) found a larger impact on black children ages 1-15, but the result was
not significant.
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results for infants and children. The expansion of Medicaid for parents does not
have any significant effect on infant deaths due to external causes, but is effective in
reduction child mortality due to external causes.
While the relationship between Medicaid expansions and a decrease of internal
causes of death is quite obvious, the reason why deaths due to external causes decrease
is less clear. One explanation is that the uninsured receive less intensive treatment, or
timely care and the other strand of explanation is that the Medicaid coverage improves
the safety behavior through better access to care and health education (Doyle 2005 ;
Howell et al. 2010). Motor vehicle accidents are the leading cause of deaths of children
ages 1-4. According to the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) report
in 2012, one out of three children died of motor vehicle accidents were not wearing a
seat belt.
I examine the children’s deaths due to motor vehicle accidents to identify whether
the improvement in safety behavior of parents related to their insurance coverage plays
a role in children’s external mortality decline. Table9 shows that the expansions of
Medicaid for children and parents significantly reduce mortality due to motor vehicle
accidents. The results suggests the possibility that the behavior of parents changes
once they are covered, such as the use of seat-belts or car-seat use for children.
These changes along with improved utilization of health care appear to have improved
children’s mortality rate.
Simulation based on ACA Medicaid Expansion
The expansion of Medicaid eligibility to low-income, non-elderly adults is a core
component of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Historically, low-income parents with
dependent children were the categorically eligible population for Medicaid, but their
eligibility income threshold was very low.23 Thus the significant change in Medicaid
23In 2012, the U.S. median Medicaid income threshold for working parents is 60 percent of poverty
line.
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eligibility for adults to 138% of poverty line is expected to improve the coverage for
low-income parents and improve the coverage gap between the child and the parent
within a family.24
The health reform was initially required to be a nation-wide Medicaid expansion,
however it became a state option through the Supreme Court ruling in 2012. How
would infant and child mortality rates be changed if the Medicaid expansion was
not optional? Based on the mortality analysis results, I simulate the infant and
child mortality rate changes according to the Medicaid eligibility changes in 2014
and counterfactual eligibility assuming every state expanded Medicaid.25 Under the
assumption that the economic conditions and the compositions of population remain
constant since the 2012, I use the CPS March 2013 data to construct the simulated
Medicaid generosity indices for infants, children and their parents.
Under the current Medicaid eligibility, the simulated U.S. average child mortality
rate decreases by 34% relative to the child mortality rate in 1990. If every state had
adopted the Medicaid expansion, the child mortality rate would have decreased more
by 5 percentage points compared with the simulated mortality under the current
Medicaid eligibility. The gain in the black child mortality rate would be larger if
every state had adopted Medicaid expansion because 1) more black children would
be eligible for Medicaid and 2) some southern states with high black child mortality
rate did not adopt the Medicaid expansion in 2014.26
The uneven Medicaid expansion may increase the disparity in mortality across
states. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the change from 1990 in the simulated child
mortality rate and black child mortality rate across states according to the current
Medicaid expansion and how much further the mortality rate would change if every
24I include 5% income disregards to the threshold 133% of federal poverty line.
25Table 10 presents the Medicaid eligibility income threshold for adults used in the simulation.
26Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska and Texas are the five highest black child mortality
states and their Medicaid income threshold for 2014 is even lower than the median income threshold
among states did not expanded (47% of FPL).
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state expanded the Medicaid. Each state that did not expand Medicaid in 2014
would have experienced a significant gain if they had adopted the Medicaid expansion.
The darker part of each bar shows the additional gain from adopting the Medicaid
expansion. The variation in the child mortality across states would have decreased by
13 percent if every state had adopted Medicaid expansion compared with the current
level of Medicaid eligibility. The variation in black child mortality would decrease by
more than 29 percent.
IV. Health Care Utilization Analysis
Uninsured parents have limited access to health care and worse health outcome
than insured parents. However, once low-income, uninsured parents are covered, they
increase their health care utilization and have improved health outcomes (Busch and
Duchovny, 2005).27 In this section, I examine whether having insured parents could
improve children’s health care utilization.
Parents, especially mothers, are the main decision makers of health investment in
children within a family (Becker, 1981 ; Case and Paxon, 2002). Thus young children’s
health behaviors including health care utilization and health outcomes, are largely
affected by their mothers’ behavior. Coverage disparities between parents and their
children raise concerns about children’s health since the uninsured parents’ limited
access to health care can affect their children’s access to care negatively even though
children are covered by health insurance. Studies have accumulated on the effect
of parents’ coverage on children’s health care utilization. They show that children
having uninsured parents experience more barriers to health care utilization than
children with insured parents (Guendelman and Pearl, 2004 ; Gifford , Iech-Maldano,
Farley-short 2005).
27Many studies have documented the relationship between adults’ health insurance status and
their health care utilization. See Buchmueller et al. (2005) for a detailed review.
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I re-examine the relationship between children’s health care utilization and par-
ents’ health insurance status. I examine young children under age 6 who are covered
by Medicaid, and analyze how their health care utilization is associated with their
parents’ health insurance status using nationwide sample.
A Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy focuses on estimating whether parental insurance status is
related to children’s health care utilization. I estimate specifications of the following
form only on children covered by public insurance.28
𝑦ℎ𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
′
2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖 (1.3)
where 𝑖 denotes each individual child and ℎ ∈ 𝐻 denotes the kind of health care
utilization; physician visit, preventive care, emergency room visit and hospitalization.
𝐻𝐼𝑖 is an indicator for the parent’s health insurance status: uninsured (𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 0) or
Medicaid covered (𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 1). 𝑋𝑖 is the set of control variables consisting of family
characteristics.29 𝜏𝑡 and 𝛾𝑟 are year and region dummies. The dependent variable 𝑦ℎ𝑖
is 1) the number of utilization of each kind of health care during a year, 2) Indicator
of having any access during a year.
The parameter 𝛽1 captures the average difference in health care utilization be-
tween children with Medicaid covered parents and those with uninsured parents. The
estimate for 𝛽1 is likely subject to the selection bias because of the differences between
uninsured parents who enrolled their children in Medicaid and Medicaid covered par-
ents who also enrolled their children in Medicaid. Children’s take-up of Medicaid
28Public insurance includes Medicaid and state-wise public insurance coverage through CHIP.
29The family characteristics are income, number of children under age 18 in the family, residency
of urban area, and the mother’s marital status, education level and work status. I also control for
the following characteristics of the children: race age, the first child, and subjective health status of
the children reported by a family member (respondent of the survey).
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remains quite low as many people fail to enroll their eligible children in Medicaid cov-
erage.30 The bias from the unobserved heterogeneity among parents confounds the
relationship between the health insurance status of parents and children’s health care
utilization. If there exists adverse selection into Medicaid enrollment among children
with uninsured parents, then 𝛽1 could be downward biased.31
Estimation Sample
I focus on Medicaid enrolled children to exclude the variation in utilization due to
their own health insurance status rather than their parents’ coverage status.32 Chil-
dren covered by Medicaid are more likely to experience differences in health insurance
coverage from that of parents than uninsured children or privately insured children
are.33 I restrict my sample to children ages under 6, living with at least one parent
and who did not enter the school in the survey year to control influences from sources
other than parents’ decision-making, because later I focus on early life mortality.34
Also I restrict the sample to both children and parents who have the same health
insurance status for the entire year to avoid possible pent-up demand for health care
utilization due to changes in health insurance status within a year. Since the mother
in the family is an important decision-maker in children’s health care, I use moth-
ers’ demographic characteristics in the estimation of children’s health care utilization
(Becker, 1981). Also I restrict the sample to children who live with their birth-mother
to avoid possible bias in health investment from living with a step-mother (Case and
30Three most common reasons are the complicated paperwork required to enroll, lack of knowledge
on eligibility, or personal aversion to public assistance (KFF,2012).
31In the sample, Medicaid covered children with uninsured parents are less healthy than children
with Medicaid covered parents (p-value = 0.007).
32Among all children under age 6 in MEPS, about 45% of children were covered by Medicaid, 8%
were uncovered and 46% were covered by private insurance.
33Whereas 97% of privately insured children also have privately insured parents, and 83% of
uninsured children have uninsured parents, only 50 % of Medicaid covered children have Medicaid
covered parents and about 30 % have uninsured parents. The rest are with privately insured parents.
34According to the calculation using March CPS, more than 94 % of children ages 0-5 are living
with at least one parent.
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Paxon(2000)).35 The final sample for the analysis includes 11,276 children.
Table 2 gives selected summary statistics for two groups: children with Medicaid-
covered parents and those with uninsured parents. Children having Medicaid-covered
parents are more likely to be disadvantaged compared with children having uninsured
parents; they have lower family income, are more likely to be minorities and live in a
single parent headed family headed by female. The disadvantages of children having
Medicaid-covered parents are not surprising because parents’ Medicaid eligibility is
restricted to very low-income levels, mostly below the poverty line. However, chil-
dren with Medicaid-covered parents are generally healthier than those with uninsured
parents, which may reflect benefits of health care access.
Children with Medicaid-covered parents utilize significantly more health care of
every kind than children with uninsured parents, despite disadvantages and better
health status they have. This reflects the likelihood that children’s health care uti-
lization is affected by parents’ health investment behavior, which is correlated with
parents’ health insurance status even though differences in children’s health insurance
status is conditioned out. I examine several dimensions of health care utilization. Pe-
diatric guidelines strongly emphasize the importance of visiting physicians for regular
check-ups. If a child does not have any physician visits during a year, this is regarded
as a strong evidence of a health care access problem. I examine physician visits and
preventive care access as the primary level, efficient form of care.36 Some studies show
that getting proper and timely access to primary care can decrease emergency room
visits or avoidable hospitalizations (Gadomski et al. 1998; Dafny and Gruber 2005).
I examine the emergency room visits and hospitalization to capture the inefficiency
in health care utilization relative to the primary level care.
35If mother does not exist in the family, I use the birth-father’s information. Within final sample
used for the analysis, 93.8% of children were living with birth-mother and 6.1% were living with
birth-father without birth-mother.
36Preventive care measure is an indicator variable reporting that a child used their usual site of
care to get preventive care and I use the variable as the proxy for getting preventive care.
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B Utilization Patterns
The results for health care utilization estimated by OLS are presented in Table
3. Children with Medicaid-covered parents have a significantly higher number of
physician visits, 5 percent more than children with uninsured parents during a year.37
Children with Medicaid-covered parents also have higher utilization of emergency
room visits and hospitalizations but the effects are not significant.
Table 4 presents the probit regression results on the probability of having any ac-
cess to the site of care during a year. The regression is to examine whether Medicaid-
covered children with uninsured parents have true access problem. Children with
Medicaid-covered parents do not have any significantly different access to any health
care except for preventive care. Having Medicaid covered parents increases the prob-
ability of getting preventive care by 12.9 percent. Different from other forms of care,
preventive care is a treatment before symptoms appear. Thus preventive care could be
the form of care which is more likely to be affected by parents’ health care utilization
decision-making.
Once the child is covered by Medicaid, true access problems decrease.38 However,
the disparity in utilization still remains even among covered children by the differ-
ence in parental coverage status. The estimates suggest that covering parents is one
possible way to improve children’s health care utilization and reduce the disparities
even among children covered by Medicaid.
The control variables also suggest some interesting differences in utilization pat-
terns across different demographic groups. The higher family income increases the
37The difference corresponds to 16% of the difference in the number of physician visits between
Medicaid-covered and uninsured children during a year (Medicaid covered children have 0.95 more
physician visits compared to uninsured children during a year). Thus, the difference in parental
coverage has non-negligible marginal effect relative to the effect of children’s own health insurance
status.
38For example, the probability of not having any access to physician offices decreases by 51%
(p-value < 0.001)
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level of utilization and the probability of access, which is consistent with the idea
that the health care utilization is a normal good. Blacks and Hispanics use less
health care. This shows that racial disparity remains even when the health insurance
coverage status of children and parents are conditioned upon. Parental education
levels also matter. When the birth-mother is at least a high school graduate, children
had 20% more physician visits compared with the utilization level of children whose
mother did not finish high school education. However, the number of emergency
room visits and hospitalization does not show any significant differences related to
the mother’s education. Children with single mothers have fewer physician visits and
are more likely to utilize less efficient care such as emergency room visits or inpatient
care. But they utilize more preventive care which is inconsistent with other inefficient
utilization pattern. This might suggests that single mothers have limited resources
and time to invest to give their children regular access to primary care, even though
they are aware of the necessity of primary care utilization.39 The result of working
mothers suggests similar pattern with utilization as with single mother. Children
with working mothers also have fewer physician visits and utilize more emergency
room visits.
It is hard to identify the causal link between the health insurance status of par-
ents and health care utilization of their children due to the endogeneity issue outlined
above. The results suggest some descriptive relationship between extending Medi-
caid coverage to parents and children’s health care utilization. Even among children
already covered by Medicaid, covering parents leads to an increase in health care
utilization of children especially primary health care. To better understand this re-
lationship, I look at an extreme but unambiguous measure of child health outcomes:
mortality.
39The other possible explanation is that mother who covered by Medicaid during their pregnancy
could be more likely to be informed for the immunization schedules for children and increase the
utilization of preventive care.
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V. Conclusion
The effectiveness of expanding Medicaid to non-elderly, non-disabled adults is con-
troversial. The key component of the evaluation of public insurance policy is whether
covering the uninsured will actually lead to improvements in health. However, the
evaluation of parental Medicaid coverage only in terms of parents’ own health improve-
ment is missing the important benefit of family coverage and the positive spillover
effects on children’s health. If such a spillover exists, the benefit of parental Medicaid
expansion would become larger than when the benefits considered are only among
beneficiaries.
Despite its importance, the question of spillover effects on children from parent
has received little attention. While a number of studies have shown that expanding
Medicaid to parents improves children’s health insurance coverage and health care
access, there is little evidence on the relationship between parental Medicaid coverage
and children’s health outcomes.
This paper fills this gap in literature by examining Medicaid eligibility for low-
income working parents from 1990 to 2004 and its impact on the mortality of children.
I do this in the presence of policy changes which induced plausibly exogenous increase
in the Medicaid-eligible population, using simulated Medicaid generosity indices for
parents and children.
I find new evidence on children’s mortality improvements following the expansion
in Medicaid eligibility. The regression estimates indicate that the increase in the
eligible parent population between 1990 to 2004 explains 5 percent of the reduction
in infant mortality rate and 4.6 percent of the reduction in child mortality rate. The
expansion accounts for a 7.7 percent reduction in black infant mortality rate and
a 7.85 percent reduction in black child mortality rate. The differential effect across
black and white leads to a significant decline in the racial mortality gap. The parental
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Medicaid expansion accounts for 10.02 percent and 10.89 percent of the reduction in
black-white infant and child mortality gaps. I interpret the different effectiveness
of parental coverage as resulting from the difference in take-up of Medicaid. The
Medicaid eligible children with Medicaid eligible parents are two times more likely to
enroll in Medicaid. Simulation results using the features of the Medicaid expansion in
the Affordable Care Act suggest that the different adoption patterns of the Medicaid
expansion across states may enlarge existing mortality disparities across states.
My findings suggest that understanding how parental Medicaid expansion bene-
fits entire family, not just parents, is important in evaluating the benefit of policy.
Secondly, the unequal adoption of policy across state could enlarge the health dis-
parities. While I suggest the improvement in primary care access as one possible
mechanism for the improvement in health outcomes of children, there could be many
other possible mechanisms affecting children’s health outcome through parental cover-
age. Further research is necessary for examining possible intra-household mechanisms
affecting children. For example the change in financial condition within family can be
one possible mechanism for improvement of children’s health outcomes. Also I only
examine young children, however the accumulated difference can also have long-term
effect on children: improvements in health outcomes among teens, young adults and
further improve productivity in adulthood. In the ACA simulation, I only consider
the Medicaid expansion but health insurance subsidies to families with high income to
be eligible for Medicaid may also make changes in parents’ coverage and further affect
children. A more detailed investigation related to these policy details and effects are
necessary.
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Figures
Figure 1-1: Growth in Medicaid Eligibility, 1990-2004
Note: The figure plots the simulated fraction of eligible children ages 1-4 and their parent population
based on our calculation from the March CPS. The high eligibility states are where parents’ Medicaid
eligibility income threshold is above the U.S. median. The figure shows that fraction of eligible
population for Medicaid was about four times higher for children than for their parents. The gap
between children and their parents is higher in the low eligibility states(𝑝− 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.0151).
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Figure 1-2: Child Mortality by Races and States, 1990-2004
Notes: The figure plots the child mortality rate by races and states’ eligibility level. The figure
shows that both of white child and black child mortality are higher in the low eligibility states. The
disparity in black-white mortality gap is also higher in the low eligibility states(𝑝− 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.018)
Source: Vital Statistics Multiple-Cause of Death File, 1990-2004
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Figure 1-3: Black-White Mortality Disparity
Notes: The figure plots the black-white mortality rate gap of infants and children. The figure shows
that the mortality gap decreased rapidly since the mid-1990s.
Source: Vital Statistics Multiple-Cause of Death File, 1990-2004
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Figure 1-4: Simulated Child Mortality Change
Note: Each bar show current estimated child mortality for states expanded
Medicaid. For states did not expand Medicaid, the bar shows current esti-
mate based on the current level of Medicaid generosity and simulated child
mortality change assuming every state had expanded Medicaid. The starting
point of bar is child mortality in 1990.
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Figure 1-5: Simulated Black Child Mortality Change
Note: The bars with light color show the simulated black child mortality
change between 1990 and simulated black child mortality rate using cur-
rent Medicaid eligibility level. For states did not expand Medicaid, the bar
shows current estimate based on the current level of Medicaid generosity and
simulated black child mortality change assuming every state had expanded
Medicaid. The starting point of bar is black child mortality in 1990.
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Table 1.1: Medicaid eligibility income threshold for working parents
1990 2004 Difference
Alabama 13.4% 19.0% 5.6%
Alaska 76.9% 81.0% 4.1%
Arizona 33.3% 200.0% 166.7%
Arkansas 23.2% 20.0% - 3.2%
California 78.9% 107.0% 28.1%
Colorado 47.8% 39.0% - 8.8%
Conneticut 63.1% 107.0% 43.9 %
Delaware 37.8% 117.0% 79.2 %
D.C. 46.5% 200.0% 153.3%
Florida 33.4% 62.0% 28.6%
Georgia 47.0% 58.0% 11.0%
Hawaii 59.5% 100.0% 40.5%
Idaho 35.8% 31.0% -4.8 %
Illinois 41.7% 140.0% 99.3%
Indiana 32.7% 29.0% -3.7%
Iowa 46.6% 82.0% 35.4%
Kansas 43.5% 38.0% -5.5%
Kentucky 59.8% 70.0% 10.2%
Louisiana 21.6% 20.0% -1.6%
Maine 74.1% 157.0% 82.9
Maryland 45.0% 40.0% -5.0%
Massachusetts 61.3% 133.0% 71.7%
Michigan 65.3% 59.0% -6.3%
Minnesota 60.5% 275.0% 214.5%
Mississippi 41.8% 35.0% -6.8%
Missouri 32.8% 82.0% 49.2%
Montana 40.8% 65.0% 24.2%
Nebraska 41.4% 56.0% 14.6%
Nevada 37.5% 87.0% 49.5%
New Hampshire 67.4% 60.0% -7.4%
New Jersey 48.2% 41.0% -7.2%
New Mexico 30.0% 69.0% 39.0%
New York 70.8% 150.0% 79.2%
North Carolina 31.5% 57.0% 25.5%
North Dakota 43.9% 69.0% 25.1%
Ohio 36.5% 100.0% 63.5%
Oklahoma 53.5% 45.0% -8.5%
Oregon 49.1% 100.0% 51.9%
Pennsylvania 47.8% 66.0% 18.2%
Rhode Island 61.7% 192.0% 130.3%
South Carolina 47.6% 97.0% 49.4%
South Dakota 42.8% 61.0% 18.2%
Tennessee 44.0% 100.0% 56.0%
Texas 20.9% 33.0% 12.1%
Utah 58.6% 53.0% -5.6%
Vermont 75.2% 192.0% 116.8%
Virginia 33.1% 36.0% 2.9%
Washington 56.9% 86.0% 29.1%
West Virginia 28.3% 38.0% 9.7%
Wisconsin 58.8% 192.0% 133.2%
Wyoming 40.9% 60.0% 19.1%
U.S. Median 45.0% 69.0% 24.0%
Source: National Governors’ Association for 1990 and
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured for 2004
information.
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Table 1.2: MEPS Descriptive Statistics
Uninsured Medicaid Difference
Health Care Utilization
Number of office-based phys. Visit 2.201 2.360 -0.158**
Number of ER visits 0.225 0.271 -0.046***
Number of hospitalization 0.054 0.075 -0.021***
Ever visited phys. office during a year 0.737 0.745 -0.008
Ever had any preventive care 0.834 0.857 -0.022***
Ever visited ER 0.167 0.187 -0.020**
Ever hospitalized 0.046 0.060 -0.014***
Family Characteristics
Total family income(thousands of dollar) 24.13 18.30 5.830***
Parent’s education(HS grad and above) 0.429 0.516 -0.086***
Single mother headed family 0.253 0.531 -0.278***
Working mom 0.416 0.509 -0.092***
Number of children in family 2.636 2.723 -0.086
Race/ethnicity of child
Non-Hispanic Black 0.113 0.252 -0.139***
Number of obs. 3,951 7,325
Note: The sample consists of Medicaid covered children ages 0-4 during the year from
1996 to 2004. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * denote p-value for difference.
* * *𝑝 < 0.01, * * 𝑝 < 0.05
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Table 1.3: Regression on children’s health care utilization
Office-based phys. Visits ER visits Hospitalizations
Parental Health Insurance
Covered by Medicaid 0.111* 0.002 0.011
(ref: Uninsured) (0.066) (0.015) (0.007)
Family and Child Characteristics
Total family income 0.009** 0.0006 0.00008
(thousands of dollars) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Parent’s education 0.449*** 0.005 -0.001
(ref: HS Drop-out) (0.061) (0.014) (0.006)
Single mother headed family -0.092 0.051*** 0.012
(0.070) (0.016) (0.007)
Working mom -0.201*** 0.033** 0.002
(0.061) (0.014) (0.006)
Number of children in family -0.154*** -0.026*** -0.003*
(0.026) (0.006) (0.002)
Race(ref: Non-Hispanic White)
Non-Hispanic Black -0.895*** -0.053** -0.017*
(0.081) (0.021) (0.010)
Hispanic -0.422*** -0.089*** -0.019**
(0.078) (0.018) (0.008)
Age -0.281*** -0.021*** -0.024***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.001)
First-born child 0.083 0.027 0.008
(0.074) (0.017) (0.008)
Health status of child
(ref: Excellent)
Very good 0.332*** 0.046*** 0.017**
(0.069) (0.016) (0.007)
Good 0.83*** 0.061*** 0.035***
(0.073) (0.017) (0.008)
Fair 2.271*** 0.408*** 0.156***
(0.149) (0.034) (0.016)
Bad 4.276*** 1.255*** 0.753***
(0.396) (0.093) (0.043)
year/ region fixed effects x x x
adj R-squares 0.1051 0.0497 0.0653
observations 9,640 9,640 9,640
Note: Coefficient estimates are from the OLS regression as described in eq.(1). Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table 1.4: textbfRegression on Children’s Health Care Access
Office-based
phys. Visits
Preventive Care ER visits Hospitalizations
Parental Health Insurance
Covered by Medicaid -0.0001 0.105*** -0.009 -0.0015
(ref: Uninsured) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034) (0.052)
Family and Child Characteristics
Total family income 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.0003 0.0013
(thousands of dollars) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Parent’s education(HS grad +) 0.176*** 0.108*** 0.009 -0.031
(ref: HS Drop-out) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032) (0.048)
Single mother headed family 0.011 0.078* 0.117*** 0.068
(0.034) (0.044) (0.037) (0.068)
Working mom 0.006 0.021 0.119*** 0.035
(0.030) (0.039) (0.032) (0.048)
Number of children in family -0.071*** -0.031* -0.0787*** -0.061***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Race(ref: Non-Hispanic White)
Non-Hispanic Black -0.154*** -0.037 -0.123*** -0.021
(0.044) (0.060) (0.047) (0.068)
Hispanic 0.011 -0.189*** -0.214*** -0.149**
(0.039) (0.047) (0.039) (0.058)
Age -0.113*** 0.107*** -0.045*** -0.199***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
First-born child 0.113*** -0.060 0.037 0.003
(0.036) (0.047) (0.039) (0.061)
Health status of child
(ref: Excellent)
Very good 0.108*** 0.087** 0.085** 0.130**
(0.033) (0.043) (0.037) (0.056)
Good 0.180 0.078 0.118 0.262
(0.036) (0.045) (0.039) (0.058)
Fair 0.343*** 0.310*** 0.571*** 0.831***
(0.077) (0.103) (0.071) (0.089)
Bad 0.750*** 0.152 1.236*** 1.299***
(0.243) (0.251) (0.179) (0.197)
year/ region fixed effects x x x x
R-square 0.0475 0.0364 0.0353 0.1138
observations 9,640 7,703 9,640 9,640
Note: Coefficient estimates are from a probit regression as described in eq.(1). Marginal effects are reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01 Since question on preventive
care started to asked from 1997, the number observations for preventive care regression is 7,703.
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Table 1.6: Probit Regression on Medicaid Take-up
Dependent variable: 𝑃 (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 = 1)
Total population black population
Broad expansion 0.093*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.006)
Targeted expansion 0.180*** 0.146***
(0.003) (0.007)
adjusted 𝑅2 0.2995 0.3066 0.2930 0.3048
obs. 165,122 20,969
Note: Dependent variable is the binary variable indicating whether
the child is enrolled in Medicaid or not. Control variables in-
clude age, race, family income and single mother headed household,
mother’s work status. Regressions also include a full set of state
and year dummies. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered
at state level. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Black-White Mortality Disparity
Panel A: Infants
Infant Medicaid Index 0.222 0.333
(2.260) (2.249)
Parent Medicaid Index -4.816** -4.821**
(1.883) (1.885)
Fixed Effects
state x x x
year x x x
adj. R-square 0.6205 0.6249 0.6242
Observation 618 618 618
Panel B: Children ages 1-4
Child Medicaid Index -0.728 -0.669
(1.140) (1.137)
Parent Medicaid Index -2.126** -2.110**
(1.049) (1.050)
Fixed Effects
state x x x
year x x x
adj. R-square 0.4206 0.4253 0.4244
Observation 510 510 510
Note: The coefficients of estimates are from eq.(2). Standard errors
are in parenthesis and are clustered by states. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05,
*** 𝑝 < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Mortality by Cause-of-Death
Panel A: Infants
Internal Mortality External Mortality
Infant Medicaid Index 1.099 -0.109
(0.942) (0.096)
Parent Medicaid Index -2.262*** -0.076
(0.715) (0.073)
Fixed Effects
state x x
year x x
adj. R-square 0.941 0.449
Observation 750
Panel B : Children
Internal Mortality External Mortality
Child Medicaid Index -0.255 -0.006
(0.384) (0.027)
Parent Medicaid Index -2.903*** -0.106*
(0.862) (0.062)
Fixed Effects
state x x
year x x
adj. R-square 0.8240 0.6567
Observation 750 750
Notes: Cause-of-Deaths are separated according to International Classification
of Diseases. Each columns are separate regressions. All observations are
state and year level with state and year fixed effect. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the state level. * 𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, ***
𝑝 < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Children Mortality caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents
Child Medicaid Index -0.364***
(0.099)
Parent Medicaid Index -0.793***
(0.226)
Fixed Effects
state x
year x
adj. R-square 0.6883
Observation 750
Note: The dependent variable is the deaths
of children ages 1-4 caused by the motor ve-
hicle accidents per 10,000 population at state
and year level.
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Table 1.10: Medicaid Income Eligibility for Adults in January 2014
State January 2014 Counterfactual
States expanded Medicaid
Arizona 138% 138%
Arkansas 138% 138%
California 138% 138%
Colorado 138% 138%
Connecticut 201% 201%
Delaware 138% 138%
DC 220% 220%
Hawaii 138% 138%
Illinois 138% 138%
Iowa 138% 138%
Kentucky 138% 138%
Maryland 138% 138%
Massachusetts 138% 138%
Michigan 138% 138%
Minnesota 200% 200%
Nevada 138% 138%
New Jersey 138% 138%
North Dakota 138% 138%
Ohio 138% 138%
Oregon 138% 138%
Rhode Island 138% 138%
Vermont 138% 138%
Washington 138% 138%
West Virginia 138% 138%
States did not expand Medicaid
Alabama 16% 138%
Alaska 128% 138%
Florida 35% 138%
Georgia 39% 138%
Idaho 27% 138%
Indiana 24% 138%
Kansas 38% 138%
Louisiana 24% 138%
Maine 105% 138%
Mississippi 29% 138%
Missouri 24% 138%
Montana 52% 138%
Nebraska 55% 138%
New Hampshire 75% 138%
North Carolina 45% 138%
Oklahoma 48% 138%
Pennsylvania 38% 138%
South Carolina 67% 138%
South Dakota 54% 138%
Tennessee 111% 138%
Texas 19% 138%
Utah 47% 138%
Virginia 52% 138%
Wisconsin 100% 138%
Wyoming 59% 138%
Source:http://medicaid.gov/AffordableCareAct/Medicaid-
Moving-Forward-2014/Medicaid-and-CHIP-Eligibility-
Levels/medicaid-chip-eligibility-levels-html
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Chapter 2
Health Care Reform and Labor
Supply of Older Workers;
Employment lock and Retirement
Abstract
This paper examines features of the Massachusetts health care reform and their impact on
the labor supply decision of older workers approaching retirement age. The individual-mandate
and availability of affordable health insurance in the marketplace may weaken the link between
the employment and health insurance. Whereas the employer-mandate applied to employers hiring
more than 11 full-time-equivalent employees implies more workers are offered a health insurance
benefit, which may increase the incentive for workers to remain employed. Given these conflicting
effects, I compare Massachusetts with other states in the Northeast region, pre- and post- reform
using difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-differences frameworks. The results show
that the early retirement hazard declines significantly among Massachusetts residents between the
pre-reform period (2001-2006) and post-reform period (2008-2013) despite the economic recession
following the reform. The reduction in the early retirement hazard is larger among individuals who
were covered by employer-sponsored health insurance.
I. Introduction
The majority of privately insured Americans obtain health insurance through their
own or family members’ employment until they become eligible for Medicare at age
45
65.1 Many studies provide evidence that health insurance availability affects labor
market behaviors based on this strong link between employment and health insurance
availability (Blau and Gilleskie (2001); Madrian (1994); Gruber and Madrian (2004)
).
Older populations are eligible for Medicare as they become age 65, but the time
gap between the Medicare eligibility and retirement are important deterrents for re-
tirement. Thus employement lock induced by employer-sponsored health insurance
(ESI) could be stronger among older workers on the margin of retirement because
medical expenditure is more likely to be high among this group.2 At age 65, individ-
uals are covered by Medicare so the employment lock effect will decline. However for
individuals contemplating early retirement, the presence of insurance on the job and
the lack of insurance off the job may be an important deterrent to leaving employment.
I focus on individuals approaching retirement age and their labor supply decision,
mainly on the extensive margin; work or exit.3 To my best knowldege, Garthwaite
et al. (2013) is the only study done so far on the relationship between employment
lock and health insurance. However, they investigate the Medicaid availability for
low income population which is not conditional on the employment, while I am more
likely to capture the effects of ESI, health insurance conditional on the employment.
Massachusetts enacted health care reform in 2006 to acheive universal health in-
surance coveage for state residents. Related to labor supply, Massachusetts health
care reform (MA reform) contains components with conflicting expected effects labor
supply. Some features in MA reform may weaken the employment lock and others
can enhance the phenomenon; an individual-mandate requires individuals to pur-
chase health insurance and reduces the adverse-selection in private insurance market,
188.9% of privately-insured population get health insurance through empoloyer-sponsored insur-
ance (KFF, 2013).
2The medical spending of 55-64 years old is almost twice as large, and twice as variable as that
of 35-44 years old (Long, 2008).
3I use the term “employment-lock” rather than “job-lock” which is more focused on role of health
insurance reducing job mobility, because I focus more on labor supply at the extensive margin.
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regulations on non-group health insurance market make affordable health insurance
available outside employment. Also the expansion of public insurance and subsidized
health insurance would weaken the link between employment and health insurance.
On the other hand, the employer-mandate increases opportunity for workers to obtain
their health insurance through employment thus possibly reinforcing the link between
health insurance and employment. Employers who previously did not offer health in-
surance to their employees would provide health insurance under the reform and some
individuals would postpone retirement to receive health insurance and retiree health
insurance.4
Massachusetts health care reform provides quasi-experimental opportunity to ex-
amine how health insurance reform can affect labor supply as a precursor to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) reform.5 Based on Massachusetts’ quasi-experimental re-
form, I try to examine labor supply behavior of individuals empirically. First, I employ
difference-in-differences(DD) method which compares outcomes of Massachusetts res-
idents to outcomes of residents in other Northeast region before and after the health
care reform.6 Also, I restrict the treatment group to Massachusetts residents who
were covered by ESI in the previous year and estimate difference-in-difference-in-
differnences(Triple-differences, DDD) model to examine how those treatment group
are affected by the health care reform.
I find that the Massachusetts health care reform caused a significant decline in
early retirement hazard of Massachusetts resident older workers. Compared to pre-
4Continuation of coverage laws (COBRA: Consolidated Omnibus Budge Reconciliation Act) man-
date employers must allow employees and their dependents the option to continue purchasing health
insurance through the employer’s health plan for a specified period of time after coverage would
otherwise terminate. The federal government mandated this coverage at the national level in 1986,
I assume the retirement preference and behavior in this paper are already taken the availabiltiy of
retiree insurance into consideration.
5CBO predicts ACA would reduce labor supply due to features of reform.
6The U.S. Census Bureau define that the Northeast region includes New England, Middle At-
lantic divisions according to the definition of Census. Conneticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Vermont are in New England Division. There are New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania in Middle Atlantic division.
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reform period, the retirement hazard declined by 4.5%. Also the decrease in retire-
ment does not make more people move to part-time employment contrary to other
studies on ACA predicted that part-time employment will increase. The effect of de-
cresing early retirement is more stronger among individuals who were covered by ESI
which suggests that individuals are more likely to remain in full-time employment
though health insurance options outside employment are available. However, indi-
viduals eligible for subsidized health insurance reduced labor supply at the intensive
margin, though they also did not exit completely from the labor force.
Many key features of Massachusetts health care reform are applied in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) which represents the most significant
health care reform in the United States in the past 40 years.7 Massachusetts’ experi-
ence with health care reform could be a precursor to national health reform to some
extent. My results provide insight regarding the potential for older workers’ labor
supply effects from the implementation of the ACA.8
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide detailed description of
Massachusetts health care reform and channels that the reform might affect labor sup-
ply of older workers. Section 3 describes the data sources and triple differences model
I use in the analysis. Section 4 presents empirical results and section 5 concludes.
II. Massachusetts Health Care Reform
In 2006, Massachusetts enacted comprehensive health care reform to bring uni-
versal health insurance coverage to residents in the state. The reform created plans
including reform of the nongroup health insurance market to make private health
insurance affordable and easily accessible through the Health Connector ; individual-
7Since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.
8However the employer-mandate feature in ACA is less restrictive compared to Massachusetts.
ACA required employers at least 50 full-time-equivalent employees and above to offer health insur-
ance benefit to their employees.
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mandate, a requirement that all Massachusetts residents age 18 and over must have
health insurance; expansion of public insurance including Medicaid (MassHealth) and
subsidized health insurance (Commonwealth Care); and an employer-mandate that
requires employers with 11 or more full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees to provide
health insurance benefits to their employees.
The Massachusetts reform began to be implemented in July 2006 and was fully
implemented by July 2007. Under the reform, there was a reduction in nongroup
insurance prices; more firms offered health insurance benefits to their employees and
increased the share of employers providing health insurance benefits to their em-
ployees.9 The number of uninsured dropped by two-thirds and Massachusetts has
continued as state with the lowest uninsured rate.
The features of MA reform may affect labor supply and labor demand through
various channels. Low-income individuals are eligible for subsidies to purchase health
insurance through Health Connector. People with income below 150% of FPL are
fully subsidized and subidies decline with rising income up to 300% of FPL. For some
people, the availability of subsidies could reduce incentives to work both through
a substitution effect and an income effect. People could reduce their labor supply
because of a subsidy as a transfer of income (income effect). The slinding scale of
subsidies is equivalent to an increase in marginal tax rates, thus some individuals
could reduce labor supply in response (subsitution effect).10
Under the reform, employers with 11 or more full-time-equivalent employees have
to offer health insurance benefit to their employees. If not, they will face a penalty
(employer-mandate). Employer-mandate can affect both the labor demand and labor
9Employer-mandate applied to employers with 11 or more FTE employees. However, even em-
ployers who are not subjected to mandate offered health insurance benefits after the reform. Firms
with 3-10 employees offering health insurance benefit increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in
2007.
10However, most full-time employees are not eligible for this subsidy under the employer-mandate
feature. Individuals who are offered employer-sponsored health insurance are ineligible for subidized
health insurance regardless of their income.
49
supply sides. Employers could impose on employees’ compensation and this could
reduce the supply of labor responsive to changes in compensation. However, Koldstad
and Kowalski (2012) estimate the welfare impact in compensation under the MA
reform and the total compensation would stay about the same and labor supply
would not be affected by the change in employer coverage.11 On the other hand,
more workers have a chance to be covered by ESI, and this could increase the chance
to remain in work in order to be covered by ESI under the expansion of ESI. Also
employers may have incentive to reduce hiring or shift their demand toward part-time
from full-time labor demand.12
Regulations over nongroup market make affordabe health insurance available out-
side employment. Older populations who expect higher medical expenditure would
value health insurance more than younger populations. They are more likely to be
attached to employers due to health insurance and employment lock may be stronger
than that of yougner population until being eligible for Medicare. However, regula-
tions over nongroup market prohibiting exclusion of pre-existing conditions and higher
preimiums for age lower health insurance cost for older population. This enables older
workers to leave labor market earlier and reduces labor supply. Also, expansion of
public insurance will weaken the link between employment and health insurance and
possible to reduce labor supply.
Based on these features of health care reform which can affect labor market be-
havior, I examine how older workers responded on to the change in heatlh insurance
system in Massachusetts.
11Individuals value ESI, mandate-based health reform in Massachusetts resulted in significantly
less distortion to the labor market than it would have otherwise.
12However, Congressional Budget Office expected that a reduction in labor from demand side
barely exist from employer-mandate feature in ACA (CBO, 2013).
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III. Data and Empirical Strategy
A Data
The primary data for the analysis are from the March Annual Social and Eco-
nomics Supplement of Current Population Survey (March CPS) for 2001-2013. The
March CPS provides comprehensive labor market status information of current month
and previous year’s. This allows me to identify the transition of labor market status
of older workers who were employed in the preceding year. Also the data provide
detailed demographics including marital status, family structure, education, health
status. Each March CPS asks respondents about their health insurance coverage in
the previous year.
To identify labor supply behavior of older workers with a focus on retirement, I
restrict the March CPS sample to male individuals approaching retirement between
ages 55 and 64.13 I restrict samples aged under 65 to avoid confounding effects from
Medicare eligibility. Eligibility for Medicare at age 65 is viewed as an important
factor in retirement decisions in many literatures (Rust and Phelan (1997), Gruber
and Madrian (1994)).14
For the labor market variables, I restrict sample to individuals who were employed
full-time at least a week in the previous year.15 Current labor market status follows
information of monthly labor force and worker status information.
With these restrictions, the treatment group is male residents of Massachusetts
ages 55 to 64 who were employed to at least one employer at least one week during
the previous year, and the control group is male residents in other states of Northeast
13I exclude female population due to lower labor force participation and higher dependency on
spouse’s health insurance plan.
14People under age 65 with certain disabilities quialify for Medicaid or Medicare enrollment
through disability insurances. I exclude population who are disability insurance beneficiaries by
restricting sample who were employed full-time in the previous week.
15Full-time work is defined as working 35+ hours a week. The number of hoours worked is based
on the number of reported hours worked in the previous week.
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region in the same age group. Since MA health care reforms were enacted and imple-
mented from July 2006, I define 2001-2006 as the pre-reform period and 2008-2013 as
the post-reform period. To avoid the potential confounding effects from the economic
recession, which began in December of 2007, I prolong the time span of analysis years
after the recovery from the recession (NBER 2008, 2012).16 In 2014 January, Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) has enacted nationwide, thus Massachusetts has to amend some
features of health care reform consistent with features of ACA, thus the post-reform
period ends in 2013.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for residents in Massachusetts and those in
other states in Northeast region for pre-reform period (2001-2006) and post -reform
period (2008-2013). Summary statistics demonstrate that the treatment group and
control group are comparable in the pre-reform period. In the pre-reform period,
residents in Massachusetts are slightly less likely to have employer-provided health
insurance and more likely to be covered by Medicaid. It is because Massachusetts
is more generous in Medicaid provision even before health care reform compared to
other states. Overall labor market status transition are similar, with Massachusetts
having a sligntly lower retirement hazard, less likely to move to part-time job. Racial
composition is also similar between Massachusets and the rest of the Northeast, with
Massachusetts population being more likely to be white. Massachusetts residents are
more educated and more likely to have higher income than residents in other states.
Massachusetts health care reform enacted only targeting residents in Massachusetts
and migration across states in seeking of benefits of different social program has no
evidence (Schwartz and Sommers (2014)).17
16The National Bureau of Economic Research determined that the peak in U.S. economy activity
occurred in December 2007 and declared June 2009 as the trough of the business cycle.
17Welfare magnet hypothesis which is claiming that geographic variations in social program in-
duces the migration of welfare receipients to places with more generous benefits or eligibility.
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B Empirical Strategy : DD and DDD
This section presents main empirical strategies used in the analysis. I first exam-
ine how the Massachusetts health care reform affected health insurance coverage of
individuals, and then examine changes in labor supply status and how these changes
varied by demographic groups.
To identify how Massachusetts health care reform affected health insurance cov-
erage I first estimate difference-in-difference regressions of the following form:
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 +X
′𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿 *𝑀𝐴𝑠 * 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.1)
where 𝑀𝐴𝑠 is a dummy variable indicating Massachusetts residency, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a
dummy indicating years from 2008 onward, and the variable 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents health
insurance status of an individual i in state s and year t including employer-sponsored
health insurance, private insurance purchased in the market and Medicaid. X is
a vector of individual characteristics including age, race, marital status, education,
family income, existence of dependent children (under age 18), reported health status,
industry and occupation dummies. 𝛾𝑡 is a full set of year dummies and 𝜆𝑠𝑡 is state-
specific time trend to control for unobserved factors evolving differently over time
across states. Error term 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 is clustered on state. The key interesting coefficient
on the interaction term 𝛿 captures the effect of Massachusetts health care reform on
health insurance coverage. This coefficient is identified by comparing outcomes in
Massachusetts after the reform to outcomes in Massachusetts before the reform and
to other Northeastern states.
As explained above in Section 2, features of Massachusetts health care reform
may affect labor supply of older workers. To identify the causal effect of the Mas-
sachusetts health care reform on labor market outcome of older workers, I first es-
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timate difference-in-differences regressions on labor supply of older male population
using the same form of equation (1). The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 in labor supply
analysis is an indicator of labor market status changes from full-time employed in the
previous year.18 The indicator includes being retired, being self-employed and being
employed part-time employed.19
I estimate the effect of the Massachusetts health care reform on labor supply be-
havior of older workers and key interest lies on retirement behavior. The estimation
strategy compares male population in the Massachusetts pre- and post-reform pe-
riod and other states in the Northeast Census region using difference-in-differences
method. All individuals in the sample are employed full-time at least a week during
the preceding year.
Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
I try to identify heterogeneity in labor supply responses to health care reform
among individuals who were offered ESI. Individuals who were previously offered
ESI are more likely to have additional health insurance options outside employment
through the health care reform. Thus I exploit population group who were covered
by ESI in the previous year and employ difference-in-difference-in-differences(DDD)
method, comparing older males covered by ESI in Massachusetts to others in Mas-
sachusetts who are not covered by ESI. The triple-difference regression model takes
the following form:
18Full-time employed indicates working more than 35 hours a week.
19Part-time employed indicates working less than 35 hours a week. Being retired is an indicator
if an individual declared he is not in the labor force as being retirement. However some individuals
regard themselves as being retired if they quit their main full-time job. Thus I restricted retired
individuals to whom declared retirement and did not work at all.
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𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 +X
′𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐴 * 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐴 * 𝐸𝑆𝐼
+ 𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 * 𝐸𝑆𝐼 + 𝛿𝑀𝐴 * 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 * 𝐸𝑆𝐼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡
(2.2)
The variable 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the outcome of interests used in DD regression. The
triple-difference model includes a full set of fixed effects and all of the two-way inter-
action terms and triple interaction term between dummy for Massachusetts residency,
dummy for Post-reform period and previous year’s ESI coverage. The key coefficient
of interest is 𝛿 the triple-difference estimate of the effect of Massachusetts reform on
older males who were covered by ESI relative to other adults.
To examine the robustness of results, we exploit the fact that the availability
of affordable health insurance unlinked to employment could affect employed work-
ers labor supply behavior. Through triple-difference analysis, I compare older male
population who were employed and covered by employer-sponsored health insurance
(ESI) in Massachusetts to other older male population in Northeast region before and
after the MA reform.
IV. Results
Table 2 presents regression estimates on health insurance coverage. After the
MA health care reform, probability of being covered by employer-sponsored health
insurnace (ESI) in Massachusets increased significantly by a 5.66 percentage points
which corresponds to 8.7% of baseline probability of being covered by ESI. Though
some predictions on ACA reform suggested that that individuals would leave full-
time job offering ESI benefit and attain private health insurance, but those effects are
not significant in Massachusetts, though outside-employment health insurance option
became available. Partly, it is due to difference in detailed features of employer-
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mandate in MA reform and ACA reform.20
Privately purchased health insurance decreased by 1.33 percnetage points and
Medicaid coverage increased by 2.01 percentage points. This change implies that labor
supply driven by the demand for health insurance possibly mainly comes from demand
for ESI and extended availability of ESI even among small firms enhance employment
lock. The health insurance status is concentrated in ESI which is expected to be the
main factor determining labor supply decision.
Table 3 presents the primary results of DD estimates; the coefficients of(MA*Post)
and DDD estimates; the coefficients of triple interaction term, (MA*ESI*Post). Re-
ported coefficients for all regressions are marginal effects from probit regressions of
equation (1) and equation (2). Three types of labor supply behaviors are included; (1)
being retired (2) being part-time employed and (3) being self-employed. All individ-
uals in regressions are males aged 55-64 who were full-time employed in the previous
year.
Panel A. of Table 3 presents DD estimates, coefficents for MA*Post. As a result
of MA health care reform, the retirement hazard drops by 0.21 percentage poits for
an individual with average characteristics. Relative to pre-reform period average,
this is about a 4.5% decline in the probability that an older worker ceases to work.
While the magnitude of this estimate is not large, it is likely to be a lower bound
because the effect is on the entire older male population including individuals who
are eligible for subidized health insurance. If income effect from subsidized insurance
is not negligible, then the effect of health care refom on reducing early retirement
could be larger.
Panel B. of Table 3 provides DDD estimates, coefficients for MA*ESI*Post. In-
dividuals in Massachusetts who were covered by ESI in the previous year are less
likely to retire in post-reform period. The retirement hazard drops by 0.89 percent-
20ACA reform mandate employers with at least 50 full-time-equivalent employees to offer health
insurance benefit while the threshold in Massachusetts is 11.
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age points which corresponds to 20% of baseline retirement hazard of individuals who
were covered by ESI in the previous year.21
While retirement hazard decreases significantly, the probability of transition from
full-time employed to part-time employed does not see any significant changes. The
majority of older Americans leaving full-time career employment moved first to a
bridge job rather than directly out of the labor force (Cahill et al. (2006)). The
results suggest that older individuals are more likely to remain in the full-time em-
ployment as a way to secure health insurance under the individual-mandate scheme
though MA health care reform made affordable health insurance be available outside
employment through new health insurance exchange system. This result conflicts
with other predictions of the effects of the Affordable Care Act reform on labor sup-
ply. The existence of new health insurance exchange system would promote workers
to move to part-time status without fear of losing health insruance before retirement
as a bridge job and leave employer-sponsored health insurance (Gallen and Mulligan
(2013)). I also examine the effect of Massachusetts reform on the probability of self-
emplyment. Consistent with the employment-lock effect of ESI, the decrease in the
probability of self-employment is expected. After the Massachusetts reform, the prob-
ability of being self-employed decreases by 1.84 percentge points (DD estimate). The
results suggest that there exists employment lock effect from Massachusetts health
care reform. Individuals are more likely to remain in full-time employed status.
However, there may be heterogeneous effects across different demographic groups
due to possible income effects from subsidized health insurance and different prefer-
ences toward health insurance. To identify whether the labor supply behavior varies
across groups in response to health care reform, I separate samples by subsidized
health insurance eligibiltiy, age and education level. Table 4 and Table 5 show DD
estimates and DDD estimates by three demographic groups respectively.
21The baseline retirement hazard for Massachusetts residents covered by ESI in the pre-reform
period is 4.42%.
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Providing free health insurance outside employment decreases work incentive for
older workers. If there exist income effect from receiving subsidized health insurane,
the reform generates different labor supply patterns among older workers based on
subsidy eligibility. Thus I separate the sample according to the eligibility for sub-
sidized health insurance and examine how their labor supply behaviors are different
with.22 Individuals are eligible for subsidized health insurance if their family income
is less than 300% of FPL and do not have ESI option. Subsidized health insurance
have both income effect and substitution effect as explained in Section 2. It is ex-
pected that individuals who are eligible for subsidized health insurance are more likely
to reduce labor supply due to income effect. Substitution effect is also expected to
reduce the labor supply due to its sliding scale. Decrease of the amount of subsidy
along income level implicitly increases the marginal tax rate and this could result in
reduction in labor supply.
Panel I. in Table 4 presents estimates for groups eligible for a subsidy and ineligible
for a subsidy. Among the subsidy-eligible population, the labor supply reduction at
the extensive margin is smaller compared to individuals who are ineligible for subsidy,
which is not consistent with the prediction of theory. However, reductions in labor
supply at the intensive margin are more likely to occur as movement to part-time work
increases significantly. Contrary to reduction in probabiltiy of transition to part-time
for population who are not ineligible though it is not statistically significant, prob-
ability of transition from full-time employed to part-time employed rise significantly
by 2.08 percentage points for individuals who are eligible for subsidy. This result
is consistent with other predictions related to ACA that increase of part-time labor
supply (CBO (2013)).23
22Massachusetts provided fully-subsidized coverage under the Commonwealth Care program to
adults up to 100 percent of the FPL as of October 2006, with the full subsidy expanded to include
adults up to 150 percent of the FPL as of 2007. Partially subsidized coverage was provided to adults
between 150 percent and 300 percent of the FPL as of July 2007. According to these rules, I split
sample with family income above 300% of FPL.
23It is also possible the change to part-time came from labor demand side. Employers can reduce
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Older populations are more likely to react more sensitively to health insurance
availability because their expected medical cost is higher thus they value health in-
surance more highly. I separte the sample by individuals ages 55-59 and individuals
60-64 to identify different effect according to age. While individuals aged 55-59 does
not show any significant change in retirement hazard before and after reform, indi-
viduals aged 60-64 reduces retirement hazard significantly by 1.05 percentage points
which corresponds to 16.5% of the baseline retirement hazard. Also the change in
retirement are more likely to remain in full-time employment.
Massachusetts health care reform also may have heterogeneous effects across dif-
ferent education level: those with higher education are more likely to be employed by
an employer who offers ESI benefit already while those with less eudcation level are
not. If the employer-mandate increases the chance for less-educated population to be
covered by ESI, then those with less education are more likely to remain in full-time
employment to obtain ESI. The DD estimate for less educated population shows that
the probability of retirement hazard decline significantly by 0.80 percentge points and
the probability of transition to part-time employed also declines significantly.
Table 5 illustrates DDD estimation of the effect of MA health care reform on
labor supply behavior transition by demographic groups. The treatment group is
older males who were covered by ESI in the previous year in Massachusetts. Since
individuals in the treatment group is not eligible for subsidized health insurance unless
they quit /retire, it is expected that employment-lock from health care reform would
be larger in the absence of income effect from subsidies. The results is consistent with
expectation. The magnitude in reduction of retirement is a lot larger among males
in Massachusetts who were covered by ESI in the previous year.
full-time employment and shift to part-time employment as a way to reduce burden of offering health
insurance benefits.
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V. Conclusion
The Massachusetts health care reform contains several features that could affect
labor supply and labor demand. The employer-mandate imposing penalty on employ-
ers who do not offer health insurance benefit to their full-time employees can result
in reduction in full-time worker hiring. However employer-mandate also increases
chance to be covered by ESI for workers who previously weren’t covered by ESI and
induces them to remain in the labor market as full-time workers to obtain health in-
surance and increases employment-lock. On the contrary, subsidized health insurance
and improvement in private health insurance market can reduce employment lock due
to employer-sponsored health insurance and make early retirement less expensive for
older workers.
In conclusion, I find that Massachusetts health care reform reduces early retire-
ment of older workers ages 55-64. The retirement hazard decreases by 4.5% in Mas-
sachusetts compared to pre-reform period (2001- 2006). However, I cannot find evi-
dences of increase in part-time labor supply which is predicted from ACA implemen-
tation though key features of ACA are based on those of Massachusetts reform.
The results suggest that Massachusetts reform reinforces employment-lock effect
and individuals tend to remain in labor market as full-time employed as availability
of ESI increases by employer-mandate. The reduction in retirement hazard is sig-
nificantly larger among population who were covered by employer-sponsored health
insurance. This result suggests that employment-lock effect coming from ESI has
been increased by increase in the number of employers who offer health insurances to
their employees after reform among older workers approaching retirement age.
The labor market status change varies across demographic groups. Availability
of subsidized health insurance makes early retirement less expensive and increases
disincentive to work. Consistent with theory predicts, low-income population who
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are eligible for subsidized health insurance reduces labor supply. However they are
more likely to reduce labor supply at the intensive margin but extensive margin.
They reduces early retirement and they are more likely to reduce labor supply at the
intensive margin and to move to part-time employment. Low-educated population
also shows significantly different pattern with college-graduated population. The
retirement hazard decreased significantly after the reform and movement to part-
time employed also decreased. The result suggests that more less-educated older
population remain employed as full-time employee compared to pre-reform period.
However, these changes in labor market status do not necessarily from labor supply
side responses. The shift to part-time labor may result from labor demand side
as employers shift labor demand to part-time employed to avoid penalty. Also the
change in attractiveness of other welfare program after health care reform affect labor
market equilibrium. For example, individuals with disabilities can have other health
insruance options than disability insurances (DI). This may lead changes in pattern of
exit from labor market for older workers because they don’t have to leave employment
to qualify DI if they have other affordable health insurance options.
It is possible that the differences between the Massachusetts and federal laws
will lead to a different result for the Affordable Care Act. However the big picture
drawn here suggests that the negativity is not really large even among older popula-
tion whose movemen to reducing labor supply is less expensive compared to younger
counterparts.
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Massachusetts Health Care Reform Features
∙ Individual-mandate: All Massachusetts residents age 18 and over must have
health insurance. Every year, residents need to show proof of health insurance
on state income tax return. If individuals do not have health insurance, the
state imposes a tax penalty varying from $240 to $1,100 a year depending on
income.24
∙ Employer-mandate: Under MassachusettsâĂŹ law, employers with eleven or
more full-time equivalent (FTE) employees had to allow non-benefits-eligible
employees to purchase individual health insurance coverage from the general
marketplace using pretax salary reduction contributions under a Section 125
cafeteria plan.
∙ The Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program provides sliding-
scale subsidized health coverage for individuals with incomes below 300% of the
Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Individuals up to 150 % FPL are eligible for fully
subsidized coverage through the program.
∙ Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector: the health insurance ex-
change system which residents can have access to affordable private health in-
surance.
∙ MassHealth (Medicaid): MassHealth Expansion raised enrollment caps of
stateâĂŹs Medicaid and ChildrenâĂŹs Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for
children and adults. Medicaid and CHIP were expanded to cover children with
family incomes up to 300% FPL and to cover adults up to 100% of FPL.
24The penalty amounts up to 50% of the amount of the cheapest health insurance plan offered
through the Commonwealth Connector.
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∙ Reform on nongroup insurance market: The state prohibit insurers from
denying coverage to people wit hpreexisting conditions.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Massachusetts Other states in Northeast
Pre Post Pre Post
N = 689 N = 739 N = 6977 N = 10,189
Age 58.51 58.87 58.58 58.77
Married 0.778 0.732 0.791 0.762
Family income 101,546 117,850 94,183 108,808
Family income less than 300 % of FPL 0.174 0.175 0.196 0.208
Race
White 0.919 0.894 0.891 0.879
Black 0.0427 0.0582 0.0721 0.0691
Native American 0.00427 0.00271 0.00238 0.00353
Asian 0.0342 0.0447 0.0348 0.0479
HS grad 0.229 0.245 0.3 0.303
Some College 0.197 0.188 0.208 0.221
College+ 0.45 0.517 0.381 0.405
Employer-sponsored health insurance 0.653 0.666 0.681 0.625
Covered by Medicaid 0.0218 0.0812 0.0179 0.0344
Reported Health Status
Very Good 0.379 0.36 0.348 0.372
Good 0.251 0.225 0.294 0.276
Fair 0.074 0.0568 0.083 0.0793
Poor 0.0145 0.0149 0.0208 0.0166
Changed to PT from FT last year 0.0218 0.0365 0.0248 0.0337
Retired within a year 0.0464 0.0311 0.0466 0.0348
Occupation
Management 0.0581 0.0528 0.0635 0.0468
Professional 0.21 0.195 0.192 0.198
Service 0.219 0.271 0.173 0.196
Sales 0.102 0.0785 0.097 0.108
Administrative 0.106 0.0839 0.102 0.0929
Farming 0.0508 0.0582 0.0589 0.0556
Construction 0.0102 0.00271 0.00889 0.00579
Installation 0.045 0.0771 0.0631 0.0762
Production 0.029 0.0433 0.0548 0.0517
Transportation 0.118 0.0677 0.108 0.081
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the CPS data used in the main
analysis. Other states in Northeast include the 8 states in the Census Northeast
region other than Massachusetts. The sample is restricted to male population
ages 55 to 64 who were employed in the previous year. Person level CPS March
weights are used.
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Table 2: The Effect of the MA Health Care Reform on Health Insurance Coverage
(1) (2) (3)
ESI Private Insurance purchased Medicaid
Massachusetts -0.0433** -0.0294*** 0.0235***
(0.0169) (0.00708) (0.00158)
Post-Reform Period -0.137*** 0.00553 0.0299***
(0.0308) (0.0091) (0.00756)
Ma*Post 0.0566*** -0.0133*** 0.0201***
(0.00638) (0.00304) (0.00209)
Aged 60-64 0.0163* 0.0139*** -0.00882***
(0.00838) (0.00355) (0.00267)
College+ 0.0217*** 0.00995** -0.0137***
(0.00524) (0.00394) (0.00353)
Subsidy -0.221*** 0.0202*** 0.0409***
(0.0111) (0.00688) (0.00657)
Note: Coefficients are from a probit regression eq.(1). Marginal effects are
reported. Regression includes age, race, education, marital status, health sta-
tus, industry and occupation dummies, year dummies and state-specific time
trends. Robust standard errors are clustered on state. Individuals in the re-
gressions are male population ages 55-64 who were full-time employed at least
a week in the previous year. Standard errors in parentheses. * * *𝑝 < 0.01,
* * 𝑝 < 0.05, *𝑝 < 0.1
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Table 4: Difference-in-difference effects by groups
(1) (2) (3)
Retired Part-time Self-employed
I. Subsidy for health insurance
Ineligible for subsidized health insurance -0.00173** -0.00421 -0.0174
(0.000743) (0.00337) (0.0115)
Eligible for subsidized health insurance -0.00735*** 0.0208** -0.0166*
(0.00224) (0.00870) (0.00884)
p-value of test for equality across group 0.0000 0.0002 0.2999
II. Age
Individuals aged 55- 59 0.000185 -0.00917*** -0.00220
(0.000530) (0.00297) (0.00984)
Individuals aged 60- 64 -0.0105*** 0.00767 -0.0313***
(0.00162) (0.00611) (0.0101)
p-value of test for equality across group 0.0007 0.0000 0.0007
III. Education
College graduates 0.00121 0.00542* -0.0122
(0.000992) (0.00328) (0.00992)
No college degree -0.00803*** -0.0144*** -0.00717
(0.00148) (0.00498) (0.00774)
p-value of test for equality across group 0.0000 0.000 0.9619
Notes: Coefficients are from a probit regression eq.(1). Marginal effects are reported. Rgression includes age, race,
education, marital status, health stuatus, industry and occupation dummies, year dummies and state-specific time trend.
Robust standard errors are clustered on state. Test for equality across group reports whether the coefficient of Mass*Post
for one groups is statistically sigificantly different from the other. The eligibility for subsidy is determined by family income.
Individuals whose family income is between 150% of FPL and 300% are eligible for subsidized private health insurance on
sliding scale and individuals with family income is lower than 100 % FPL are eligible for Medicaid and eligible for fully-
subsidized health insurance if family income is between 100% of FPL and 150% FPL. I treat all individuals with family
income under 300% of FPL are eligible for subsidy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * * *𝑝 < 0.01, * * 𝑝 < 0.05,
*𝑝 < 0.1
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Table 5: Triple-difference estimates by groups
(1) (2) (3)
Retired Part-time Self-employed
I. Subsidy for health insurance
Ineligible for subsidized health insurance -0.0162*** 0.0143** 0.00540
(0.00470) (0.00714) (0.0179)
II. Age
Individuals aged 55- 59 -0.00263 0.0112 -0.00135
(0.00517) (0.00903) (0.0164)
Individuals aged 60- 64 -0.0171** 0.000414 -0.0312
(0.00802) (0.00922) (0.0265)
p-value of test for equality across group 0.0002 0.1270 0.0308
III. Education
College graduates 0.00598 0.0161*** 0.00241
(0.00820) (0.00614) (0.0180)
No college degree -0.0249*** -0.00836 -0.0226**
(0.00851) (0.0122) (0.0101)
p-value of test for equality across group 0.0000 0.0005 0.0068
Notes: Coefficients are from a probit regression eq.(2). Marginal effects are reported. Rgression includes age, race, education,
marital status, health stuatus, industry and occupation dummies, year dummies and state-specific time trend and pair-wise
interaction terms and a triple-interaction term Robust standard errors are clustered on state. Test for equality across group
reports whether the coefficient of Mass*ESI*Post for one groups is statistically sigificantly different from the other. The
eligibility for subsidy is determined by family income. Individuals whose family income is between 150% of FPL and 300%
are eligible for subsidized private health insurance on sliding scale and individuals with family income is lower than 100 %
FPL are eligible for Medicaid and eligible for fully-subsidized health insurance if family income is between 100% of FPL
and 150% FPL. I treat all individuals with family income under 300% of FPL are eligible for subsidy. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * * *𝑝 < 0.01, * * 𝑝 < 0.05, *𝑝 < 0.1
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Table 6: DDD estimates for group aged 60-64
(1) (2) (3)
Retired Part-time Self-employed
MA*Post -0.0112*** -0.000115 -0.0212***
(0.00253) (0.00343) (0.00696)
MA*AGE60-64*Post -0.00538 0.0251** -0.0382***
(0.00444) (0.0118) (0.0145)
Observations 9,329 9,329 9,329
Notes: Coefficients are from a DDD estimation using probit regression on population aged
from 60-69. Marginal effects are reported. Rgression includes age, race, education, marital
status, health stuatus, industry and occupation dummies, year dummies and state-specific
time trend and pair-wise interaction terms and a triple-interaction term. Robust standard
errors are clustered on state. Treatment group is male residents of Massachusetts aged 60-64
and control group is male residents of Massachsetts aged 65-69 who are eligible for Medicare
and barely affected health care reform in terms of health insurance coverage.
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